Articles from the North

Raymond McCord, whose complaint about a police investigation into his son's murder led to the ombudsman's report, is to stand in the assembly election.

Mr McCord said on Tuesday that he intends to stand in north Belfast in the March election for the NI assembly.

He said he felt "dismayed" at the reaction of unionist politicians to Nuala O'Loan's report.

It said police colluded with loyalists behind over a dozen murders in north Belfast.

The report found that UVF members in the area committed murders and other serious crimes while working as informers for Special Branch.

"I am going to give the Protestant and Catholic people a chance in north Belfast to put somebody in who is not frightened to tell the truth of what is going on here," Mr McCord said.

"This campaign will stay on until people are in jail for my son."

Raymond McCord Jnr was murdered on 9 November 1997.

The 22-year-old Protestant who had spent four years as a radar operator in the RAF was beaten to death by the UVF.

He had been a member of the organisation and is also said to have had some involvement in drugs.

The report, published on Monday, said information held by police and corroborated from a number of sources, indicated that Informant 1, who was in prison at the time, ordered his murder and that another man, who was on leave from prison, carried it out.

It added that the ombudsman has established that there were a number of failures with the murder investigation which may have significantly reduced the possibility of anyone ever being prosecuted for the crime.

DLP leader Mark Durkan has named three former heads of Special Branch who he said failed to cooperate with a Police Ombudsman investigation.

Using parliamentary privilege he identified them as Chris Albiston, Raymond White and Freddie Hall.

Northern Ireland's Police Ombudsman found officers colluded with loyalists behind over a dozen murders in Belfast.

Her report said several high-ranking officers refused to cooperate with the investigation into collusion.

In the Commons, Prime Minister Tony Blair said the government deeply and bitterly regretted any collusion that had taken place on behalf of anyone working for Special Branch in the RUC in the wake of the ombudsman's findings.

During prime ministers' questions on Wednesday, Mr Durkan described collusion as "a fact not a myth".

'Attack her report'

Nationalists have called on the former Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan to resign from his post as Head of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

But Sir Ronnie said on Tuesday that he had no knowledge of any collusion when he was chief constable of the RUC in the 1990s.

Mr Durkan said Sir Ronnie had presided over an "anything goes, nobody knows" culture in Special Branch.

The SDLP leader asked: "Is it not a disgrace that three former heads of Special Branch failed to cooperate with the Police Ombudsman's investigation - Chris Albiston, Ray White and Freddie Hall - but two of them now attack her report and her office?" Police Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan is currently briefing the Policing Board on her findings of RUC collusion with loyalists.

A Sinn Fein delegation is expected to call for action from the Irish government during a meeting later with Irish Foreign Minister Dermott Ahern.

In an interview on the BBC's Spotlight programme on Tuesday, Sir Ronnie dismissed calls for his resignation as Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary.

"I reject that as chief constable it would have been easy or possible for me to know all that is going on in relation to the handling of informants within one unit, of one paramilitary organisation, in one geographical area of Belfast," he said.

Ho visto il servizio su Bbc.

Gajardo Durkan.

FOUR FAMILIES of Derry IRA men killed on active service have called on Sinn Fein president, Gerry Adams to apologise for what they've branded "cheap shots at fallen volunteers".

A statement from the families of George McBrearty (shot by SAS in Creggan in May 1981), Paddy Deery (killed in an explosion in Creggan October 1987), Patsy Duffy (shot by British Army in Maureen Avenue in November 1978) and Brian Coyle (killed in an explosion in July 1986 in the Bogside) have hit out at comments made by Mr. Adams at a public meeting in Co. Tyrone on Saturday.
"At a Sinn Fein meeting in Galbally, Gerry McGeogh (veteran republican, former gunrunner and anti-PSNI activist] pointed out that the current direction being taken by the Sinn Fein leadership is the opposite of the republican tenets held by fallen volunteers in the conflict at the times of their deaths.
"Gerry Adams mocking reply to Gerry McGeogh - "do you have a Ouija board" - was in very bad taste.
"It marks a new low in the debate on policing. We never thought a so-called republican leader would stoop so low as to take cheap shots regarding fallen volunteers.
"To speak disrespectfully of the dead volunteers is shameful and he should apologise immediately."
In a letter to the editor in today's edition of the 'Journal', the Deery, Duffy and Coyle families show their support to the McBrearty family who spoke frankly in last Tuesday's edition in opposition to Sinn Fein's plans to back the PSNI.
"We too have felt a deep sense of betrayal at the direction taken by the Sinn Fein leadership. We have been silent until now because we have seen how voices of dissent have been subjected to ridicule, intimidation and smear campaigns.
"W have received invitations to the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis and another political briefing. We will treat these invitations with caution. We do not want to be used as political window-dressing for the endorsement of the RUC/PSNI," the letter reads.
Meanwhile, the brother of George McBrearty (24) - who along Charles 'Pop' Maguire (20) died in a hail of British Army bullets as he approached a car on Lonemoor Road at the height of the 1981 hunger strikes - has called a meeting of all republican ex-prisoners in the North West for tonight.
Speaking to the 'Journal', Danny McBrearty said: "Given the ongoing debate on policing in the republican community and signs that the Sinn Fein leadership are about to endorse joining the RUC/PSNI, I feel that concerned Republicans have to organise now.
"I am appealing to all ex-internees and republican socialist POWs who have been through the system this last 36 years to contact me with regard to attending a meeting on Tuesday, January 23 at 8pm sharp." For Further details ring Danny McBrearty on 07734108189.
23 January 2007

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Sinn Fein spin on policing
Dear Sir,
As long-standing friends of the McBrearty family, we welcome and endorse their comments on the policing debate.
The McBrearty family described the Sinn Fein leadership as having been "systematically dishonest" with the republican base. Martina Anderson has replied on behalf of Sinn Fein.
Firstly we note that although the letter was signed "The mother, brothers and sisters of Vol. George McBrearty", Martina chooses to single out George's brother, Danny, as though he is some sort of troublemaker.
She then states: "The reality is that, for such an assumption to be true (that the Sinn Fein was/is "systematically dishonest"), then he is effectively labelling the Republicans he talks about as being naive or gullible."
This statement, we think, is probably a fairly good example of the type of dishonesty the McBreartys had in mind, that is, the use of spin to attempt to make things look like the opposite of what they really meant. However, in order to defend the Republican base from Martina's suggestion that they might be "naive or gullible" (not the McBreartys' words), we would add that the dishonesty or hoodwinking referred to has not only been systematic but expertly handled. Nor should Martina mistake the trust the Republican base has previously placed in the Sinn Fein leadership for naivety or gullibility.
When the phrase "systematically dishonest" was used in the McBreartys' letter, they tried to keep their eye on the bigger U-turns such as "No Return to Stormont" (now fighting tooth and nail to get into Stormont), "Not An Ounce Not A Bullet" (not an ounce or a bullet left!), and, we would add, "Disband the RUC" (now changed to "Join the RUC/PSNI"). Then there's the big positional U-turn from "Republican strategy is to resist British rule in the failed political entity of the Six Counties" to "Let's administer and enforce British rule and law in the Six Counties!" An obvious pattern seems to be appearing ie one of systematic dishonesty.
Martina's Provisional Sinn Fein spin technique and choice of words are proof of the ongoing' smaller, subtler attempts to dishonestly manipulate the Republican base that have become all too common in recent years – either that or she herself is "naive or gullible".

PADDY MCGLINCHEY, THOMAS MCGLINCHEY,
Addresses supplied
23 January 2007

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Families of dead volunteers 'feel deep sense of betrayal'
Dear Sir,
As families of IRA volunteers killed on active service, we would like to offer our support to the McBrearty family and agree with the sentiments contained in their letter.

We too have felt a deep sense of betrayal at the direction taken by the Sinn Fein leadership. We have been silent until now because we have seen how voices of dissent have been subjected to ridicule, intimidation and smear campaigns.
Since the McBrearty family letter, we have received invitations to the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis and another political briefing. We will treat these invitations with caution. We do not want to be used as political window-dressing for the endorsement of the RUC/PSNI.
We also agree with the political analysis contained in the McBrearty family letter: the volunteers of the IRA fought and died to resist the British occupation of the six counties, this remains the case. While we fully understand the need to adapt tactics and strategies to out-manoeuvre the enemy, we cannot see how joining the Crown forces, carrying British weaponry (in place of destroyed or surrendered Republican weapons), and administering British rule in Ireland can advance the Republican cause of our patriot dead.

The Families of Volunteers Patsy Duffy, Paddy Deery and Brian Coyle.
23 January 2007

A GROUP of ex-republican prisoners from various paramilitary organisations have claimed that Sinn Fein is now the dissidents party in the 'republican family'.

At a meeting in a city centre bar on Tuesday night a new breakaway republican grouping called 'Ex POWs and Concerned Republicans Against the RUC/PSNI' was set up to oppose Sinn Fein's move towards the endorsement of the police.
The group has called for other "like-minded" republicans to fall in behind its banner at this Sunday's Bloody Sunday march in the city.
Spokesman for the group, Danny McBrearty - whose brother George McBrearty was shot dead by the SAS in Derry in May 1981 - told the 'Journal': "We formed the new this new body after much deliberation in opposition to Sinn Fein's railroading of republicans into endorsing the PSNI. Generally what we are trying to do is harness members from across the republican family whether they be ex-INLA, ex-IRA or ex-official IRA, ex-IPLO and so on.
"We believe that we are now the mainstream republicans, there has been a massive shift which has been assisted by the Sinn Fein leadership. We now see ourselves being the voice of mainstream republicanism.
"We don't consider ourselves to be dissidents, we consider Sinn Fein to be the dissidents," he added.
Membership
The new group is focused on rolling its membership out across the six counties ahead of any Assembly election this year.
And Mr. McBrearty has stressed that the group's first key task would be to "garner support" for anti-PSNI republican candidates across the North.
"There is going to be an election soon if Sinn Fein endorse the police this Sunday and we are hoping to garner support for candidates opposed to that move," he said.
It's already been confirmed that the mother of Derry hunger striker Patsy O'Hara - who died in 1981 - is to contest the election in the Foyle constituency as an abstentionist independent republican candidate, should Assembly elections be called. Peggy O'Hara (76) says she will run in her son's memory.
26 January 2007

Derry Journal


come posso dargli torto....sembra che i 'veri' repubblican si sono lasciati i PSF in 1986......e che PSF sono veramente i dissendenti da quel punto......

No need for Tammany tactics this time

(by Ed Moloney, Irish Times)

It is now nearly twenty-five years since the IRA in South Armagh forcibly abducted a soldier in the Ulster Defence Regiment and, in an extraordinary irony, set in motion events that will in all likelihood culminate tomorrow in a decision by Sinn Féin's ard-fheis to accept and recognise the policing, criminal justice and prison systems of Northern Ireland.

The soldier's unthinkably terrifying ordeal at the hands of the IRA's most ruthless unit on the island sent the Belfast-based Redemptorist priest, Fr Alec Reid hotfoot to the door of the Provisional movement's de facto leader, Gerry Adams in what proved to be a vain effort to save his life. Whether Fr Reid arrived too late or his intercession was always doomed, we will never know; the unfortunate soldier, Sgt Thomas Cochrane was interrogated, shot dead and his corpse dumped a few days later beside a hedgerow near the Border.

Although the Redemptorist priest failed to save Sgt Cochrane's life the dialogue with Gerry Adams that followed, starting in November 1982, marks the beginning of what became the peace process. Fr Reid knocked at Mr Adams's door at a distinctly opportune moment. In its first, non-hunger strike electoral outing under the Sinn Féin label, the IRA's political wing had just days before won five seats to the now forgotten Prior Assembly at Stormont, to the great – but as it turned out, misplaced – dismay of constitutional Ireland.

The true signifance and potential of that Assembly poll was scarcely noticed at the time: a viable, and potentially more advantageous political alternative to violence had opened up for the Provo leadership. Within a short time Gerry Adams and Fr Reid had designed the building blocks for what would become the IRA's ceasefire, the Good Friday Agreement and all that has followed.

It has been a long and twisting journey between that tragic event in South Armagh and the gathering of Sinn Féin members at the RDS tomorrow but with the benefit of hindsight a number of conclusions can be drawn from that trek about the way the Provisional movement under the Adams leadership conducted and conducts its business.

One is that virtually every policy initiative and strategem, both military and political, proposed by that leadership and adopted by both wings of the movement since the early 1980's was conceived and implemented in order to ensure that, eventually, tomorrow's meeting could happen.

Another is that it has always been much easier to manoeuvre, cajole and otherwise propel the IRA down the desired road than Sinn Féin. The reasons are simple. The IRA during the period of the peace process was much smaller than Sinn Féin, never more than 400 to 500 members, all of them known to the leadership, many promoted by it and their status and wellbeing dependent upon unfaltering loyalty to that leadership. It was and is a disciplined, military outfit whose orders come from an Army Council that Gerry Adams and his allies had dominated since the late 1970's. Shaped and formed by that leadership, the IRA of the peace process was one with little patience for internal democracy, where debate was minimal or staged, and dissent stamped out ruthlessly.

One way or another the IRA was always easier to control and, apart from one short-lived rebellious bout in 1996, was invariably amenable to the will of the Adams' leadership. The failure of Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, British premier Tony Blair and their various advisers to understand this, and to realise that IRA decommissioning could, had they insisted, have been delivered much earlier than it was, led directly to the collapse of such middle ground as there was in the North, to the eclipse of the SDLP and Ulster Unionists by Sinn Féin and the DUP. If the Irish and British prime ministers are showered with plaudits on Monday for their handling of the peace process it would do no harm to keep that in mind.

By no means untainted by authoritarianism, Sinn Féin was nonetheless a different creature. Larger and more diverse than the IRA, it was a place where debate and dissent could and did exist, where political ideas were challenged, often by people who saw themselves as the guardians of the republican consience and ideology. Bending Sinn Féin to the leadership's will was often much more difficult.

No better example of this can be found than in the Provisionals' rejection of the federal Ireland programme of the Ruari O Bradaigh/ Daithi O Connail leadership. A prerequisite to winkling the two men out of leadership positions, and eventually out of the Provisionals altogether, Eire Nua was binned by the Army Council in 1979 but it wasn't until 1982, just before Gerry Adams succeeded O Bradaigh as president of the party, that Sinn Féin was persuaded to ditch the policy.

Sinn Féin's stubborn resistance to the IRA's diktat at times meant that when it came to ensuring that the party towed the line unconventional methods were adopted.

A startling example of this came with the passing of a key milestone on the peace journey, the 1986 ard-fheis decision to drop abstentionism in the 26 counties, a vote that forced Ruari O Bradaigh's departure and gave the infant peace process credibility in government circles.

None of us in the media noticed at the time but mysteriously the number of delegates suddenly doubled for that one meeting. The previous year the ard-fheis had defeated a dry run motion proposed by the Adams' leadership saying that abstentionism was not a principle but a tactic by 181 votes to 161, a total of 342 votes. Any attempt to change Sinn Féin policy on the issue seemed doomed. But the next year, 1986, the vote went dramatically the other way. A leadership motion to drop abstentionism in the Dail was won by 429 to 161 with some 38 abstaining, shading the required two-thirds majority by just 11 votes. That was a total of 628 votes, nearly twice the number voting twelve months before. The following year, however, the number of delegates voting settled back to its normal 350 mark and even in 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was endorsed it was the same total, with 331 for and 19 against.

So where had the extra 300 or so votes come from in 1986? The passage of time eventually loosened enough republican tongues for the truth to emerge. The IRA had arranged for the creation of over 100 ghost cumainn that were all duly registered at Sinn Féin's headquarters, whose bureaucracy was by then safely under the Army Council's control. Although none of the new branches had any members they were entitled to send two delegates each to the 1986 conference, which they duly did. According to republican sources these were really Army Council delegates, loyal IRA members committed to dropping abstentionism no matter what Sinn Féin thought. In such a way was history made and the peace process made possible.

There was similar sharp footwork at the May 1998 ard-fheis which approved the Good Friday Agreement, but this time it was the British and Irish governments, not the IRA, which choreographed the steps. A first ard-fheis was held in mid-April but the mood of the grassroots was decidedly hostile to the accord and its unexpected centrepiece, a new Assembly at Stormont. One sample of delegate views showed that only 44% favoured the deal, well below the two-thirds needed. Wisely the Adams leadership stayed its hand that day.

A second ard-fheis was held three weeks later but this time delegates arrived to discover that 27 well known IRA prisoners held in Irish and British jails, including the notorious Balcombe Street gang, had been specially released for the event. The effect of their presence was to remind delegates that if they failed to endorse the deal these prisoners would return to jail and spend many more years behind bars. Not surprisingly the Good Friday Agreement was approved by 94.5% of the ard-fheis.

It would be surprising if the Sinn Féin leadership resorted to such Tammany Hall-style tactics tomorrow. For one thing they are probably unnecessary. After all the Sinn Féin of 2007 is the Sinn Féin of Mary Lou McDonald and her ilk, not Ruari O Bradaigh. This track record of chicanery is nonetheless one reason why some view the prospect of the Sinn Féin leadership entering government and gaining access to the levers of power in either part of Ireland with less than unalloyed enthusiasm. But it also shows that Gerry Adams and his colleagues never go to an ard-fheis on a matter of importance unless they are pretty sure what the result will be.

January 27, 2007
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Ed Moloney is author of A Secret History of the IRA.

Militant republicans shout surrender but unionists should say 'well done Gerry'

(by Suzanne Breen, Sunday Tribune)


As a young IRA activist, Gerry McGeough remembers monitoring police radio transmissions that night in May 1981. "'The piece of meat is coming in now,' I heard a voice in the police barracks announce. Then, 20 or 30 minutes later, another voice at another barracks declared 'that lump of meat has just arrived here'.

"I didn't know at the time but that was hunger-striker, Patsy O'Hara, making his final journey from Long Kesh, home across the countryside, to Derry. At every police station the hearse stopped, his body was brutalised. Cigarettes were stumped out on Patsy's face, his nose was smashed."

McGeough's powerful oratory led to a standing ovation by the 400-strong crowd at an anti-policing meeting in Derry last week. He accused Sinn Féin leaders of being willing to do anything – including supporting a previously denounced police force – to secure political power for themselves.

A former Sinn Féin ard comhairle member and IRA gun-runner, imprisoned in Germany and the US, McGeough said: "I'm not a war-monger, nor anti-ceasefire, but we need a new political deal. The current leadership has made one u-turn after another. We've given them the benefit of the doubt for too long. It must now be said – they couldn't negotiate their way out of a wet paper bag."

Today, when Gerry Adams addresses the special ard fheis, he's unlikely to face such fierce criticism. The outcome of the vote isn't in doubt: the only question is how great his margin of victory will be.

Sources predict over 70%, with some forecasting support as high as 80-90%. Anti-PSNI speakers are likely to be confined to the lower ranks – some Southerners and Ogra Sinn Féin. At worst for the leadership, a handful of Northern councillors might oppose the motion or walk out.

Senior DUP figures, like Jim Allister MEP, have challenged the Rev Ian Paisley. There is no Sinn Féin equivalent. Over the years, internal leadership critics have walked away disillusioned, or been marginalised.

The process of near canonisation of the Sinn Féin president among nationalists, was evident at a meeting on Wednesday in Clonard Monastery, west Belfast. It was amazing theatre. Surrounded by statues of the Blessed Virgin and Jesus, the stations of the cross at his side, the tabernacle behind him, Adams preached a new belief in policing to the faithful.

His four bodyguards, with ear-pieces, stood in the aisles. It was like a scene from 'The Godfather'. Eighty-five year old Jim Keenan thought the holy setting apt. Pointing to the Sinn Féin leadership, he said: "We should be down on our knees praying for all these people doing a wonderful job. These men know what they're doing. God bless them all."

Keenan had practical reasons for endorsing policing too. He was worried about crime and was frightened to go out at night in case "somebody puts a knife in me". A young man disagreed: crime in nationalist areas was suddenly being exaggerated to suit the agenda of those keen to sign up to policing.

Another young man said it wasn't about the PSNI catching burglars and rapists, it was abut MI5 running agents and death squads. A south Belfast Sinn Féin member complained that plastic bullets remained legal and said the PSNI would be "MI5's foot soldiers", bugging houses, arresting and even killing people.

The Sinn Féin president relied heavily on the post-ceasefire, feel-good factor for nationalists. Things had changed, he said: it was wonderful to see young folk "wearing their county ganzies, speaking an Gaelige".

Just because the previous generations had it rough, didn't mean their children and grandchildren had to. Those who disagreed with Sinn Féin policy should join the party and change it. One man said that was rubbish: "people in your own party who weren't sheep or nodding dogs were deselected or pushed out". But the overwhelming majority of the congregation retained faith in Adams.

Liam Andrews said "collaboration with human rights' abusers" in the PSNI would be "a betrayal". Another man said Sinn Féin would "hunt out" such individuals. Clara Reilly of Relatives for Justice who lost family members during the conflict, "some of them volunteers", supported signing up to policing and was sure young nationalists would never accept second-class citizenship. An East Tyrone woman said she could never envisage the leadership betraying its people.

A Belfast woman said she suffered a stroke after police raided her home. Her family were regularly harassed, her children detained on the roadside for lengthy periods. "Am I going to have to tell them to now look out for Mr Adams and Mr McGuinness, in police uniforms, coming to the door?" she asked.

The Sinn Féin president told his own tale: his mother had died after a police raid on her home, he himself had been arrested, beaten and shot. He won praise from an old enemy. Prof Liam Kennedy of Queen's University, who had previously stood for election against Adams on an anti-paramilitary ticket, hailed this "courageous" change on policing.

In contrast, Liam Hannaway, a relative of Adams' currently facing dissident paramilitary charges, was disgusted. No republican could support the PSNI. "Every man, woman and child has the right to bear arms while the British remain in Ireland," he said, to applause.

But the reception for Adams was louder when he said "there is only one IRA" and noted that other republican groups had killed only civilians and not "one member of British crown forces".

Surprisingly unlike the Tyrone and Toome meetings, more anti- than pro-PSNI sentiments were expressed in west Belfast. But trust in the leadership carried the day. Mark Durkan, making the exact same arguments as Adams, would have been chased.

However, Adams wouldn't have won converts at the anti-PSNI Derry meeting. Ex H-block hunger striker Brendan McLaughlin, now in a wheel-chair, denounced "those telling the same lies as Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera".

Davy Clinton, from a well-known republican family in Belfast's Lower Ormeau, urged an alternative to Sinn Féin leaders whom he accused of vanity: "If Gerry Adams and Gerry Kelly were Mars bars, they'd eat themselves."

Former blanket-man, Seosamh Mac an Ultaigh, said: "Ten men starved to death to beat Thatcher. Now they're asking us, who refused to wear the criminal uniform in jail, to wear the criminal uniform of the British police. How Thatcher must be laughing into her gin-and-tonic!"

Another man said: "My uncle, Desmond Beattie, was shot dead in this city in 1971. I became a volunteer. I've stood by the leadership but not any more. I apologise to every republican that I followed that leadership so long. Vote them out! Vote them out!"

Former Sinn Féin Assembly member, John Kelly, said more Catholic recruits didn't guarantee a fair police force. "As a teenage republican in Belfast in the 50s, I recall a ferocious Catholic Special Branch officer, Cathal Brugha Ramsey.

"He'd grab me by the back of the neck as I walked up Clifton Street and haul me into the barracks. He'd slap me and start shouting, 'what's my name?', wanting me to admit he was called after a great patriot. When I wouldn't, he'd thump me again and yell 'I am Cathal Brugha Ramsey.' And he'd keep hitting me as he shouted in Irish." .

Dissent has been strong in Derry – around 100 ex-prisoners and relatives of dead IRA members have formed an anti-PSNI group. But a Sinn Féin meeting on Thursday showed leadership supporters still command a majority in the city.

Sinn Féin talks nonsense when it says supporting the PSNI is about storming unionists' last bastion to bring Irish unity closer. Yet, it's necessary nonsense to convince a community whose gut instinct is anti-police.

The family of Robert McCartney, two years dead next week, might well wish such movement had come sooner. Sinn Féin's foot-dragging defies logic: the PSNI is no better nor worse than when McCartney was murdered.

But Adams' commitment to selling the criminal justice system, however belatedly, can't be faulted by the governments. Nuala O'Loan's report didn't cause a wobble. Neither did the British government, currently putting legislation through the House of Commons to permanently guarantee no-jury Diplock courts and emergency powers in the North. Until now, annual parliamentary approval was required.

Of course, Sinn Féin's motivation on the PSNI is selfish: the party wants into government in the North in time for the Dail elections. But for all bar the militant republican community, it's better late than never. Unionists should set aside sectarian begrudgery and say, 'well done Gerry'.

January 28, 2007

Da Belfast, Andrea Varacalli, Les Enfants Terribles Editor in Chief

Ard Fheis alle spalle, lo Sinn Fein cerca risposte negli unionisti.
L'ethos della base nazionalista si unisce ricorrendo al 'tradimento' degli ex compagni.
Il Dup non è pronto per Stormont, Adams e McGuinness sono avvertiti


Molto si è detto e molto altro si dirà nei prossimi giorni. A 24 ore dall'Ard Fheis dello Sinn Fein, riforme e riformismo lasciano sempre l'amaro in bocca. Inquietano alcuni, fanno sperare in una nuova dinamica politica transnazionale di Adams altri. Eppure entrambe queste posizioni si discostano e apparentemente contraddicono quella macchina perfetta che li univa. Ha ragione Adams quando dice che una fase si è completata ieri con il voto di Dublino alla Royal Dublin Society. La monopolizzazione della messaggio repubblicano, egemonico e coercitivo del riformista Sinn Fein si è conclusa. Dopo anni di sedimentazione in cui si è passati dalla conquista dell'Army Council alla naturale selezione degli 'Yes Men' che lo hanno composto; anni di bavagli e punizioni, della castrazione del Noraid e della Brigata del S'Armagh di Micky McKevitt. Anni confusi e desunti dalle mitologie quotidiane, dai profili di personaggi orwelliani ossessionati dal controllo, paranoici e avvilenti, hanno esaurito la magia inibitoria sulla nuova generazione repubblicana che non ha più intenzione di bussare. Sfondare la porta per parlare. Un realismo critico e prolifico quello visto al Conway Mill, a Toomebridge e Derry. Il forum repubblicano è entrato in una nuova fase della propria esistenza che si contrappone alla più semplice delle realtà. Realtà di lotta che erano, sono e saranno fuori dall'orbita dalla perversa fase d'integrazione costituzionale, dal ventre dei sistemi di conservazione unionisti nello statarello nordirlandese. Da ieri, non vi è differenza tra lo Sinn Fein e gli Brits. Parlano, agiscono e allestiscono con la stessa voce, con gli stessi strumenti. Con la stessa uniforme. Ecco che in una fattoria retta da regole gerarchiche, nessuno ha intenzione d'instaurare un rapporto interlocutorio e di confronto con lo Sinn Fein. È riformismo. No, non tradimento. C'era scritto nel GFA dal '98. "But I see the light!" Quando, ieri? I repubblicani dell'ultima ora che dalla scorsa settimana si sono ' sentiti minacciati, esclusi, isolati e appunto "traditi". A questi gentiluomini è doveroso rimembrare che loro hanno sostenuto le duecentoventi riforme di Chris Pattern, nero su bianco e votate a maggioranza su un controverso quanto funambolico referendum incostituzionale tra Nord e Sud; riforme che erano chiare, cristalline almeno quanto Stormont. Il cul de sac era stato scritto per esser letto. Di quelle 220 iniziali, l'ex Segretario di Stato Peter Mandelson ne ha ridipinte 175 ad hoc per il cuscinetto di tolleranza nazionalista nella partizione. A questo imbarazzante bivio del giogo inglese, ci si è arrivati ancora una volta con lo spinning di spie come Donaldson, di temporanei ministri della corona seduti nell'Army Council, e soprattutto con la vostra colpevole sciatteria di chi identifica in un uomo, Adams, l'ideazione di un progetto politico. Per questo non avrebbe senso, oggi, caricarvi sull'autobus che sta per partire. Siete inaffidabili, inutili e pericolosamente manipolabili. È un messaggio forte quello del 32Csm, di O'Bradaigh e della Cira, e della giovane arrabbiata Irsp/Inla. Signori, una divisa vale l'altra quando questa non è sovrana in Irlanda. Ma per capire meglio il funzionamento dell'osservatorio sul Nordirlanda in questo momento della straniante esperienza repubblicana, l'elaborazione del linguaggio politico degli unionisti e dello Sinn Fein condensa meglio di qualsiasi altra ricchezza idiomatica popolare. Non è 'scandalosà ne un 'tradimentò la sintesi dell'obbligata operazione degli shinners nei comparti amministrativi e istituzionali britannici. Oppure, accorgersene adesso, solo adesso, implicherebbe che siamo cretini. Visto che crediamo di non rientrare in quest'ultima categoria, siamo quindi obbligati, noi osservatori, a difenderci dalla trivialità di altre zone d'ombra morali, emotive e calcolate nel buio; calibrando delle meno facili pause di sostituzione. Con una puntigliosa indifferenza sull'orizzonte degli eventi illustrati da Adams e soci, chi scrive cercherà di rimuovere la propria sensibilità sulla consonanza che lo lega ad altri ambienti repubblicani da quasi quindici anni.
Il Democratic Unionist Party ha valutato con una mozione di partito la tattica del monitoraggio dello Sinn Fein ad Ard Fheis compiuto. Siamo qui. L'astuta iniziativa risale al nove novembre scorso. Ad un mese dagli Accordi di Saint Andrews che de facto hanno riscritto e sostituito gli Accordi del GFA di Belfast.

Le elezioni di Marzo. Il DPP

Mancano dei passaggi. Domani (30 gennaio, ndr) McGuinness e l'esecutivo dello Sinn Fein si rincontreranno a Dublino in vista del nuovo dossier della Commissione Indipendente di Monitoraggio, Imc, che in combinazione con il gigionismo di Londra e Dublino dovrebbe allestire le quinte per l'ingresso unionista a Stormont e quindi formare il governo. Ripartiamo. Gli unionisti non formeranno mai l'Assemblea di Stormont con gli shinners prima che questi abbiano abbracciato il DPP. District Policing Partnership. Al tavolo con Hugh Orde per alleggerire i compiti d'investigazione di polizia nelle aree cattoliche e repubblicane. ' Tradimento!!!' Buoni, con forza soprannaturale trasciniamoci nelle zone più imperscrutabili di questa affascinante bizzarria ai limiti della razionalità storica irlandese. Solo con grande capacità di pausa ci si può liberare dall'occlusione degli aspetti visibili, dal perché sparare per un secolo sull'uniforme degli brits e poi aspirarne la divisa. Riconoscere le Diplock senza giuria. Collaborare con i sistemi giudiziari e legali della colonia. Eppure, ciononostante, sarà quindi crisi dissolta per Nigel Doods, Ian Paisley e William Mcrea? No. La scala è ancora lunga. Londra, senza dubbio tirerà verso le elezioni sperando di pescare il jolly tra i relitti dell'Ulster Unionist Party di Reg Empey. Possibilità uguali allo zero, ma la doppia natura del governo inglese, la caparbia appendice che abita oltre le parantesi di governo a Downing Street, nel ventre dell'establishment di controllo/et/paranoia del regno, parla con la stessa voce del reverendo di Ballymena. Chiudono inchieste (O'Loan), alzano muri di omertà (Bloody Sunday) e spruzzano cortine fumogene (Pat Finucane, Rosemary Nelson, Robert Hamill) per salvaguardare militari e governatori della corona nelle sei contee e in Inghilterra.
Adams e McGuinness, Kelly e Doherty, oggi (29 gennaio ore 13 qui a Belfast) aspettano un segnale dagli unionisti e uno da Blair. Un segnale forte che indichi la rotta più rapida verso Stormont. Il Dail a giugno, Fianna Fail vicina alla coalizione. Ma il destino di questa brillante carriera dei neocostituzionalisti di West Belfast è solo nelle loro mani. Tempi e cadenze risiedono esclusivamente nei loro tempi di maturazione. Saranno gli unionisti a decidere quando. Il Democratic Unionist Party vuole vedere i risultati dell'Ard Fheis sulle strade, nei tribunali, nelle inchieste sulle rapine (Northern Bank, Dodds vuole i nomi che già conosce davanti ad una Corte), sugli omicidi (McCartney, il mattatoio di Short Strand). Londra, Dublino e gli unionisti vogliono soprattutto i nomi dei cosiddetti dissidenti (argomento in cui si soffre d'incontinenza da almeno 8 anni); dallo Sinn Fein vogliono sapere tutto della faida di Ballymurphy.
Devolution entro maggio 2008. Devolution entro maggio 2000. Otto anni di scadenze. Doods in privato confessa che nessun unionista sarebbe mai disposto all'Assemblea mista con questa generazione di ex provisionals nel parlamentino Britannico a Belfast. "Stormont è una cosa troppo seria per lasciarla nelle mani degli inglesi". Che voleva dire? Disincantato il leader di North Belfast, a cui i provisionals tentarono di uccidere il bambino in ospedale, fa corrispondere al doppiogiochismo del laboratorio MI5 nello Sinn Fein la medesima ambiguità. L'estate scorsa Paisley, nel Grande Dodici del North Antrim, a Port Rush, ha fatto tremare i rami delle querce quando con una fiammata dal petto ha ruggito "Over our dead bodies". Non otterranno mai Stormont. Mai con il nome Sinn Fein, mai con questi uomini. Sarà ancora lunga.

Alla bulgara. 95% all'Ard Fheis. 900 delegati. Sono sempre stati 300. Di quei 300, dalla sigla sul trattato di pace, sullo storico sporco 300, ne sono rimasti 50. La seconda scissione tre mesi fa. Oggi, lo Sinn Fein è costituito da mille aspetti di penetrazione e trasformazione in corso d'opera. Diversamente dall'impianto partitico del Sud, vicino al welfare e al disagio, ottima sponda per qualsiasi governo di centrosinistra, lo Sinn Fein del Nord muta e controlla le Stalingrado repubblicane. Il grande fratello ti segue fino in bagno. Inquadrato, dettava ordini e neutralizzava. Un po come ieri. Gli osservatori più attenti, e le truppe vicine ai provisonals, parlano di comparse e cestini merende nella cornice del voto di Dublino. Laurence O'Neill, minacciato. Dominic McGlinchey, figlio di Mad Dog McGlinchey, leader storico e carismatico dell'Inla ucciso nel '94 (come la stessa madre di Dominic nell'87 dalla Sas mentre lavava il suo bimbo nella vasca da bagno), addirittura si è scomodato Martin McGuinness in persona, scortato da un paio di magilla gorilla, poco prima di natale è andato ad aspettarlo all'angolo di casa per richiamare alla lobotomizzazione del Provos Bretannia il trentenne ribelle che sta dando serio filo da torcere agli shinners. "Ci sarà sangue nelle strade" se tuo nipote non rientra nei recinti. Paul Mcglinchey esce dallo Sinn Fein, Dominic diventa l'obiettivo e nemico numero uno della leadership del Nord. Organizza dibattiti, unisce il fronte repubblicano antagonista.

L'ombrello

Leaders e uomini. Gerry McGeough. Quarantotto anni. Ex O.C. delle cellule europee, ha coordinato per un decennio gli attacchi sulla basi americane e britanniche in Germania. Arrestato ed estradato nelle galere USA, Gerry è uno dei repubblicani più solidi della brigata Tyrone. Ex compagno di Jim Lynagh, Gerry sta crescendo nel South Derry. Noto negli ambienti dissidenti come uno dei migliori operativi dell'Ira di sempre. Si presenterà a Tyrone nelle liste indipendenti.
Marian Price, Francie Mackey, Paul Little, Willie Gallagher. Ruari O'Bradaigh. Classificazione, discussione e alternative. La rappresentazione dello scenario repubblicano è ripulito dunque di quei filtri con cui la possibilità di ricomposizione dello scacchiere è stata imbavagliata.
In questo nuovo, fresco, contesto - congiuntamente alla deriva degli shinners - la tradizione repubblicana si interroga rationalis naturae nella riflessione di se stessa, nello specchio d'acqua che riflette trent'anni di lotta armata, politica e passiva (Long Kesh), imperativa alla sovranità sulle 32 contee.
La rievocazione non pretende naturalmente d'impadronirsene. Saranno solo loro a decidere tattiche e sviluppi, Rischi e letture di una società che sta cambiando. Inglobando il regionalismo alla scozzese con il progetto Trinità sulle loro rive, spostando mezzo miliardo di sterline per la centrale d'informazioni di jamesbond dal Tamigi a Belfast. Il pericolo Islamico è a Manchester, Bolton, Newcastle, nelle periferie di Bristol. Da una moschea all'altra, da un tampone sociologico del British National Party all'altro. Londra dopo le V2 è stata la città più bombardata del mondo per 30 anni. Non da Allah, ma dall'IRA. È quindi centralizzando le realtà ultranazionaliste europee che fanno ricorso i governi per saturare l'emorragia. Dai baschi ai fiamminghi, Londra insegna: è il laboratorio che frammenta e ricostituisce. Ora sulle sponde del Lough, Holywood.
Unless British.

Let, Distretto Nord >>

By Neil Mackay
Since the Sunday Herald was founded in 1999, it has led the way in exposing the “dirty war” in Northern Ireland. Today, we report on the most shocking revelations to date. Our investigations show that far from merely “turning” terrorists to work for the state, British military intelligency actually created loyalist murder gangs to operate as proxy assassins. They even cleared areas in which the gangs were operating of police and army, to allow them to carry out their hits and escape.
ON MONDAY, the world was stunned by the release of a report by Nuala O'Loan, the police ombudsman for Northern Ireland, which stated that Special Branch officers in Belfast had "colluded" with loyalist terrorists working for the British state as informers. According to O'Loan, police failed to stop these paramilitary gangs, part of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) from killing an estimated 15 people in the 1990s. While this was seized upon by republicans as proof that security forces had aided a loyalist campaign of sectarian assassination, in reality O'Loan's findings barely scratched the surface of a 30-year history of criminality and murder orchestrated by the British army and the Ulster police.

HE INSISTS on being named only as "JB", a sick, ageing man, who fears that ill-health or a bullet from an assassin wishing to silence him will claim his life before he has the chance to tell the true story of his life and crimes. On Wednesday, JB passed a bundle of papers to the Sunday Herald, making up the bulk of his unpublished memoirs, which paint British military intelligence as a callous, murderous, criminal cabal. JB claims that he - and dozens of other members of the terrorist organisation, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) - were trained and armed by military intelligence.

He also claims select UVF officers were ordered by military intelligence to carry out assassinations against both IRA figures and ordinary Catholics. Such soft targets as innocent men and women were pinpointed by military intelligence in order to psychologically undermine the nationalist population of Northern Ireland and cut the support base from beneath the Provisional IRA.

Martin Ingram, the false cover name for a former member of the covert British military intelligence outfit the Force Research Unit (FRU), has supported the claims made by JB. Ingram eventually turned whistleblower, disgusted at the deaths the FRU had caused by colluding with terrorists in Ulster. He later went on to write a book about the double agent Stakeknife - IRA operative Freddie Scappaticci - who had been "handled" by Ingram's FRU team and exposed by Sunday Herald investigators. Ingram says he is aware of JB's history, and believes his claims are "completely credible". Loyalist sources have also confirmed JB's credibility.

continued...

JB, who was convicted twice of terrorist offences, once in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s, says he carried out some 50 UVF operations sanctioned by his handlers in the Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF), the army team which gathered intelligence and ran agents in Ulster. He says he became a "killer, bomber, arsonist and robber". Of the 50 state-sanctioned operations he took part in, "not all were successful".Some, he says, "were aborted". So far he has refused to go into details of the actual murders he took part in on behalf of British military intelligence. Beyond admitting that killings took place, he will only talk about how the British army trained him as a terrorist proxy.

In JB's words, "military intelligence trained, armed and moulded squads of loyalists to put pressure on the IRA to abandon their campaign of bloodshed and carnage". JB was a young UVF member in the early 1970s when first approached by an MRF handler. JB says the military intelligence officer, whom he will name only as "Mike", told him that the then prime minister Edward Heath had sanctioned the "training of loyalists".Mike later added that "nobody, except at the very highest level of the British government and senior officers of the military" knew about the covert counter-insurgency operations.

Mike told JB that "London has ordered the war be taken to the IRA obviously this can't be done openly and must be done covertly. That's why we are looking for people like you ... We are enlisting men from all over the province to co-ordinate attacks, to convince the Catholic people that support for the Provos will only bring death and destruction to their own community."

As well as being trained in firearms at army barracks and firing ranges around Northern Ireland - primarily at Palace Barracks near Holywood in County Down - men like JB were also provided with intelligence on potential targets and given details about which targets to hit. JB knows of at least 30 loyalists who received similar training to him, but believes more than 120 could have been trained as proxy assassins. At times, he was given a British army uniform to provide him with cover while with his handlers. He even drank, on occasions, with his handlers in the Naafi - armed forces bars on military bases.

When proxies like JB were dispatched on a murder operation, military intelligence would impose an Out Of Bounds (OOB) order on the area in which the attack was to take place. In military terms, an OOB means an intelligence operation is under way and army and police are forbidden from entering the area. This gave loyalist murder gangs freedom to operate with impunity during such state-sanctioned attacks. At one stage, claims JB, Mike told him: "Mr Heath and the top brass have given the green light for this."

JB was trained by military intelligence, he says, in how to use a variety of hand-guns, machine guns and rifles, as well as bomb-making techniques. The UVF men working for military intelligence were also given consignments of guns and ammunition by handlers, sent on gruelling fitness courses and schooled in the arts of surveillance, counter-surveillance and intelligence gathering. Other classes included lectures on forensic science, how to avoid leaving incriminating evidence at the scene of crimes and how to steal cars for use in assassination operations.

JB also claims military intelligence instructed loyalists to plant explosives in a Catholic bar to make it look as if the IRA had accidentally set off the bomb. It was hoped such acts would drain Catholic support for republicans.

The bomb was planted in McGurk's Bar in Belfast on December 4, 1971. It killed 15 men, women and children. The immediate blame was indeed placed on the IRA. However, seven years after the bomb, a UVF man received 15 life sentences for the atrocity. JB says he was told about the planned bombing two weeks before the attack and was with his handler at the time it happened. He also claims he saw his handler take pot-shots at republican youths on the streets of Belfast around this time.

A captain in military intelligence spelt out the reasons for the army creating these secret counter-insurgency cells during one discussion with JB. He said: "This type of war can't be won by conventional means. The only solution is to implement a counter-operation, to counteract the violence of the enemy by heaping more violence on them That's why we've chosen men like you to instil trepidation and pandemonium among the Provos and their support base, the Catholic community We will match whatever they do, and outdo them."

In the weeks leading up to the events of Bloody Sunday in Derry, on January 30, 1972, in which the Paratroop Regiment killed 13 people taking part in a civil rights demonstration, JB was informed by his handlers that the British army had been ordered by the Cabinet "to use whatever force and tactics necessary to put these troublemakers down". JB "concludes there were plans for mass murder to be committed that day The Bloody Sunday massacre was sanctioned by the government and top military chiefs." JB is sure that there was a preconceived plan to open fire on the civil rights demonstrators, with the full knowledge this would cause civilian deaths. He believes military intelligence thought this would shake the IRA. Instead, the massacre was a huge boost to IRA support and recruitment.

The day before Bloody Sunday, JB was taken for a training session at Palace Barracks, where he was given a pep-talk by a major who praised him for "having the courage and loyalty to participate in covert actions against the common enemy". The major told JB: "We are hoping to provoke a confrontation with the IRA in Derry, and give them an example of what to expect in future attacks." JB was then offered the chance, he claims, to accompany his military handler, Mike, to Derry to watch the operation to contain the demonstration. Military intelligence sources today say events such as this would help forge a bond, or esprit de corps, between agent and handler.

JB was provided with a British army uniform, a gas mask, camouflage face-paint and a rifle as cover for the time he would spend in Derry with his handler. During the events, JB watched from a military intelligence observation post as soldiers opened fire on civilians. He also claims to have seen members of military intelligence shooting at, and hitting, unarmed civilians from the gun nest in the observation post.

Another killing carried out by loyalists and facilitated by military intelligence by the imposition of an OOB order took place in February 1972 when a bomb exploded in a pub killing, one Catholic man and injuring five others.

Trained proxies such as JB were often taken on "dummy run" assassination operations by handlers to ensure the OOB system wasworking. An OOB order would be given on a specific area of Belfast and JB and his team would enter the area, locate the home of a target, recce it and then leave. If they met with no security force patrols, they knew the OOB system was effective.

Mike at one time told JB: "We don't expect every time an ASU active service unit of the UVF goes out, they will kill somebody. The mere fact an attempt has been made and shots fired, even if they wound or miss altogether, is all part of the terror tactics." The policy was meant to "scare the ####" out of Catholics. Mike also instructed JB on how to "extract information" from Catholics or republicans they kidnapped. The techniques were "gruesome", JB said. Mike made clear that torture should be used, and referred to the victims as "Taigs", a derogatory term for Catholics. Mike also advised on the best shot to use to dispatch a victim of a backstreet execution.

WHILE refusing to give a statement about the actual operations in which he took part, JB said he knew about a number of high-profile loyalist atrocities, sponsored by the MRF. These included the shooting of three members of the Miami Showband, a popular Irish group, in July 1975. The band's bus was flagged down by members of the UVF dressed in army uniforms at a fake military checkpoint. Another MRF-sponsored atrocity, says JB, was the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of May 17, 1974, which killed 33 people and injured 250.

JB lists a series of killings by loyalists which were facilitated by military intelligence putting out OOB orders on the location where the target lived, including the murder of a taxi driver, an eight-year-old girl, various men walking alone in Catholic areas and a Catholic woman in a bomb blast at public toilets in Lurgan. Referring to the last killing, JB says: "As long as it was a Catholic killed, fear would be creeping into Catholic minds - who would be next?'"

When UVF proxies were targeting republicans or IRA men, nearly all the intelligence used in planning hits came from the British army's intelligence wing.

Perhaps the most horrible of all hits facilitated by military intelligence, says JB, was one that involved the infamous Shankill Butchers murder gang. An OOB was put in place, allowing the UVF to put up an illegal roadblock at which they abducted a Catholic man and took him to the head of the Shankill Butchers - a UVF psychopath called Lenny Murphy. The gang tortured their victims for hours with knives before finally executing them. Sometimes the torture sessions took place in front of baying crowds in loyalist drinking dens. At least 19 people died at the hands of the gang. JB states: "I verify and confirm what I have written is a true and very accurate account of events."

sundayherald.com/analysis/analysis/display.var.1152814...

Riunisco qui, d'accordo anche con Omagh, gli articoli postati in questi giorni, per creare un archivio di notizie riguardanti l'Irlanda di sopra.

R